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Eighteenth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

(This report covers the week from 15 June through 21 June 1973)

This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense

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COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the week from 15 June through 21 June 1973)

The Key Points

- A group of North Vietnamese artillery personnel totalling an estimated 200 to 250 men was observed beginning the infiltration trip toward southern Laos during the week. While the group's departure had apparently been delayed for some reason, it clearly will leave North Vietnam well after the 15 June effective date of the Paris "Communique."
- Communist logistic activity remains at very low, rainy-season levels in southern Laos, but has increased in northern South Vietnam and in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
- Combat activity in South Vietnam diminished within a few days after the Paris "Communique" went into effect on 15 June. Activity in Laos remained at a very low level.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the eighteenth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communistinitiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

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A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

- One new group of North Vietnamese Army combat personnel was detected beginning the infiltration trip south from North Vietnam during the week. The group is destined for southern Laos and probably contains about 200 to 250 artillery personnel. Since it was still located within North Vietnam as of 18 June, it was clearly to depart the country well after the 15 June effective date of the Paris "Communique." Of the combat infiltration groups which we have detected in recent months, this is the first one since February 1973 which has been earmarked for southern There are indications that this group may have originally been scheduled to make its trip southward in late 1972, but that its departure from North Vietnam was delayed (for reasons unknown to us) for some six months. If this is in fact the case, the group's movement at this time does not of itself presage a resumption of large scale infiltration to southern Laos.
- 2. In addition to these combat troops, during the week we also detected eleven additional small groups of civil and military specialists--probably totalling around 200 men--who are presently moving south in the infiltration pipeline.

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
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- 3. Our total estimate of North Vietnamese personnel infiltrating into South Vietnam and adjacent border areas since 27 January now stands at some 51,000--25,000 of whom were already in the infiltration pipeline as of 27 January plus nearly 26,000 who started their infiltration trip since that date. (Annex II, ______ contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration which was received during the past week.)
- In northern Laos, at least one company of a North Vietnamese engineering battalion appears to be withdrawing to North Vietnam. The company, which formerly operated in the Plaine des Jarres area, was identified as having recently arrived in the Laos/ North Vietnamese border area and was scheduled to continue its move eastward. There is no evidence toindicate that the battalion's headquarters or other two subordinate companies are also withdrawing; on the other hand we have no information on the locations of these units since mid-May. Although we have no firm evidence on the reason for this move, there have been previous indications that a number of NVA combat units were to reposition for the rainy season. There is no hard evidence that any combat units have yet withdrawn from northern Laos, but some may return to North Vietnam to rest and refit as they have done in previous rainy seasons.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Through and Into Laos and South Vietnam

5. The pattern of logistic activity in southern Laos was essentially unchanged from that observed during the preceding several weeks. Cargo movements in the Laos Panhandle--which is now well into the rainy season--have slowed to a funereal pace. In contrast to recent weeks, however, there was an increase in the movement of supplies through the Vinh area of North Vietnam. In addition to the continuing movement of vehicles through the Dong Hoi area, there were substantial quantities of ammunition detected being transferred around Vinh, at least part of which

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	was destined for onward shipment to either northern	
	Laos or South Vietnam. There was also an increase in Communist supply movements in northern South	
	Vietnam, as the North Vietnamese continued to implement the major "transportation campaign" in	
•	this area which we discussed last week. (See	
25X1	ANNEX III, for more details on this subject.)	
	6. The following instances of Communist lo- gistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during	
	the period. Activity observed in South Vietnam prob-	
	ably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. This activity, while it is carried out	
1	by military logisticians, may well have a dual purposeto resupply the combat forces, but also to pro-	
	vide logistical support for the civilian population	
1	in Communist-controlled areas. In recent months, the North Vietnamese have brought at least 20,000 civilia:	
	into the northern areas of GVN MR 1. (The map on the	
	following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)	
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.0,(1	a) there were 89 cargo trucks detected on Route 9 between Dong Ha and	
	the Laos/South Vietnam border (21 east- bound, 27 westbound, 41 parked).	-
25X1	b) 92 cargo vehicles were ob- served on the western segment of Route	
	9 between the Laos/South Vietnam bor-	
	der and the junction with Route 6088 (8 eastbound, 5 westbound, 79 parked).	
25X1	c)there were 84 cargo trucks	
-	on Route 6089 south of Khe Sanh (5	
	northbound, 31 southbound, 48 parked).	
25X1 -	d) there were 109 cargo ve-	
	hicles detected on Route 616 southeast of Khe Sanh (23 northbound, 42 south-	
	bound, 44 parked).	
	-4-	
25X1		



25X1

e)

seen along Route 9 between the Laos/
South Vietnam border and the junction
with Route 6088 (4 eastbound, 4 westbound, 23 parked).

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90 trucks (11 southbound, 25 northbound, and 54 parked) were observed on Route 6089 south of Khe Sanh, and 42 trucks (7 southbound, 28 westbound, and 7 parked) were seen on Route 616 in the same area.

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g) 86 trucks (43 northbound, 13 southbound, and 30 parked) were observed on Route 548 in the A Shau Valley.

7. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

a) The table below lists observed NVA vehicle activity on selected routes in the Laos Panhandle during the reporting period.*

Rt 958 Rt 99 Rt 9211 1(1-N)NC 1 (Parked) 0 1(Parked) 7(3-S)0 NC 1 (Parked) NC 3(1-S)0 0 NC NC NC NC NC NC NC

^{*} The first number in each entry is the total number of vehicles. Of these totals, the number of trucks moving north (N) or south (S) are noted in the parentheses after each total. The remainder of the vehicles detected were parked along the roadway. "NC" indicates no coverage.

- b) On 14 June, 11 cargo vehicles were sighted on Route 914 south of Tchepone (1 northbound, 2 southbound, 8 parked).
- 8. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies probably destined for South Vietnam and northern and southern Laos.
 - a) Between 29 May and 15 June, a transshipment point south of Vinh reportedly received over 210 tons of cargo from another facility in the same area.
 - b) On 12 and 13 June, 7 tons of 82-mm mortar ammunition were dispatched from a storage facility in the Vinh area to Route 7 for delivery to northern Laos.
 - On 13 and 14 June, there were over 160 tons of weapons and ammunition observed moving between logistic entitles in the Vinh area, including over three tons of recoilless rifle ammunition specifically designated for shipment to South Vietnam.
 - d) On 15 June, an NVA logistic unit operating north of Dong Hoi received 1,100 tons of assorted cargo, including foodstuffs, medical and quartermaster supplies, and over 200 tons of explosives.
 - e) On 15 June, over 30 tons of ammunition, mostly 57-mm AAA, were observed moving between logistic units in the Vinh area. On the same date, over 50 tons of assorted ammunition were sent from Vinh to northern Laos via Route 7.

- f) On 18 June, three barges were detected moving on the Gianh River north of Dong Hoi carrying 112 tons of unidentified cargo.
- g) On 19 June, 30 northbound and 45 southbound cargo vehicles passed through the operational area of an NVA logistic unit north of Dong Hoi.

C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

9. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January and for the last week (15-21 June) are shown below:

Military Region		e Ceasefire f Action	Last Week (Level of	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,050	3,453	25	94
MR 2	278	1,926	14	72
MR 3	409	2,692	7	116
MR 4	711	6,485	33	319
Totals	2,448	14,556	79 (112) <u>1</u> /	601(710) <u>1</u> /


1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

10. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular

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VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

11. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

MILITARY REGION 1

- a) On 15 June, ARVN forces 32 miles southwest of Da Nang received a ground attack.
- b) On 17 June, ground fire downed a VNAF UH-1H helicopter 30 miles southwest of Da Nang.

MILITARY REGION 2

- a) On 15 June, friendly forces 10 miles west of Kontum City received a ground attack.
- b) On 18 June, ARVN forces seven miles south of Bong Son received a ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 3


a) No significant activity.

MILITARY REGION 4

- a) On 15 June, friendly forces six miles southwest of Vi Thanh received a ground attack.
- b) On 17 June, ARVN forces eight miles southwest of Ca Mau received a ground attack.

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- D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Week From 15 Through 21 June
- 12. On 14 and 15 June, a government local defense force which had been under intermittent enemy pressure in the San Soak airstrip area in extreme northern Khamouane Province was finally driven from the area by an estimated two enemy companies. Over 350 refugees followed the withdrawing government troops to the village of Pha Hom, approximately 30 kilometers northwest of San Soak.
- 13. Elsewhere, Communist-initiated combat activity in Laos during the week was limited to small scale harassment actions.



ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese Personnel to the South

- 1. During the past week, one regular infiltration group--5059--was detected in the pipeline in North Vietnam destined for southern Laos. The group was initially observed in northern Quang Binh Province on 18 June. It is believed to be artillery-associated and probably represents a delayed move by one out of a bloc of such groups that deployed to the Laotian Panhandle in late 1972. The numerical sequence of this new group suggests that two additional combat groups deployed undetected to southern Laos earlier this dry season, probably prior to the 22 February ceasefire agreement in Laos.
- 2. Eleven small special purpose groups—ten destined for South Vietnam and one for southern Laos—were also detected for the first time during the past week. Only one group, however, was observed starting its trip south from Binh Tram 18 in North Vietnam; the other ten were noted farther down in the infiltration pipeline in the southern Laos/South Vietnam border area. The location and date of detection of the eleven groups indicate that they all started their journeys south prior to the 15 June effective date of the Paris Communique. The following table lists those infiltration groups which were initially reported during the past week.

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Infiltration Groups Initially Reported During the Past Week

Group Designator	Strength	Location	Date of Detection
5059	Unknown	North Vietnam	18 June
QL 102	13	South Laos/SVN	4 June
QL 113	11	South Laos/SVN	20 June
QL 206	Unknown	South Laos	12 June
QL 330	4	South Laos/SVN	4 June
z 116	27	South Laos/SVN	17 June
z 136	Unknown	South Laos/SVN	19 June
z 213	Unknown	South Laos/SVN	15 June
Y 115	28	South Laos/SVN	17 June
KB 861	Unknown	South Laos	12 June
332	11	North Vietnam	13 June
412	Unknown	South Laos/SVN	18 June

ANNEX III

NVA "TRANSPORTATION CAMPAIGN" IN NORTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM

Intercepted messages received during the week indicate that the North Vietnamese "transportation campaign" in northern South Vietnam (on which we reported initially last week) is continuing. campaign started on 11 June and is to last until 25 June. To date, shuttling of vehicles and supplies from north of the DMZ to areas at least as far south as the A Shau Valley has been noted. Major quantities of supplies, including POL, have been involved in this campaign, but references to military hardware or ammunition have been sparse. With the onset of the rainy season in the Laos Panhandle and the relocation of a number of major NVA logistic units from that area eastward into South Vietnam, the Communists probably intend to increase their stockpiles along this new supply corridor which runs through western South Vietnam all the way from the DMZ to the central highlands. In addition, this transportation campaign, while it is being carried out by military logisticians, may well have a dual purpose -- to resupply the combat forces, but also to provide logistical support for the civilian population in Communist-controlled areas. In recent months, the North Vietnamese have brought at least 20,000 civilians into the northern areas of GVN MR 1.

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